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Abstract: This is the first study to use the self-organisation (Kohonen) map technique, an artificial
neural network based on a non-supervised learning algorithm, to categorise Vietnamese banks into
super-class groups. Drawing on unbalanced yearly data from 2008 to 2017, this study identifies two
super-class groups (one and two). While group one consists of joint stock banks, group two consists
of commercial state and joint stock banks. Using the non-structural indicator, the Lerner index, to
capture market power, and the data enveloped analysis technique to measure bank performance, our
result shows significant differences in Lerner scores (which represent bank market power) of the two
groups of banks. Differences in the Lerner scores provide evidence of a group of strong banks that is
isolated from other banks. This implies that this strong bank group has the potential to be monopolist
and impairs Vietnam’s competitive banking environment. The reason is that group two banks may
be more profitable due to greater market power, whereas group one banks may struggle to cut costs
to remain viable. These findings provide a better understanding for bank executives, policymakers
and regulators of the Vietnam banking industry, and ensure an efficient and competitive Vietnam
banking environment.
Keywords: self-organisation maps; artificial neural networks; monopolists; market power; Vietnam
JEL Classification: E50; G34
1. Introduction
After the 2008 global financial crisis (GFC), Vietnam banks faced unprecedented
challenges, including economic recession, credit growth rate stagnation and extraordinary
levels of non-performing loans (KPMG 2013). On the 1st of March 2012, the Vietnam
government issued the “Restructuring Financial Institutions 2011–2015” programme as
a response to these financial challenges (Decision no.254/QD-TTg). The restructuring
programme was designed to bring the Vietnam banking system into line with international
standards (Le 2014; Nguyen et al. 2014, 2016a). The main features of the restructuring
programme were: (i.) permit foreign ownership of local banks with a maximum of 20%
share; (ii.) support all local banks to register shares on the Vietnam stock exchange; (iii.)
require all commercial banks to have at least 3000 billion VND in bank capital and capital
adequacy requirements (minimum 9% in 2010); and (iv.) encourage merger and acquisition
(M&A) activity to improve the competitiveness and performance of the Vietnam banking
industry (Hoang et al. 2016).
Restructuring, achieved largely through M&A, has had a significant impact on the
competitive environment and performance of the Vietnam banking industry in several
ways. First, as scholars note, M&As reduce the total number of banks and thus increase
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market concentration (Fernández de Guevara et al. 2005). This increase in bank concentra-
tion has drawn the attention of researchers, who have begun to measure Vietnam banking
competitiveness using the Lerner index (Nguyen 2018; Nguyen et al. 2016b). These studies
indicate that Lerner indexes range from 0.158 to 0.21 over the period of 1995 to 2016. Second,
M&As impact on bank performance. As Angelini and Cetorelli (2003) note, when banks are
faced with increased market competitiveness, they may consolidate, merge or acquire other
banks to improve their performance. Scholars have examined Vietnam bank cost-efficiency
using a range of methods, including data envelopment analysis (DEA), stochastic frontier
analysis (SFA) and Bayesian regression of an SFA (Nguyen and Nghiem 2018; Nguyen et al.
2016a, 2016b; Vu and Turnell 2010). Studies have found that the cost-efficient scores for
Vietnam banks range from 0.61 to 0.93. These studies cover different periods, from 1995 to
2014 (Gardener et al. 2011; Nguyen and Nghiem 2018; Nguyen et al. 2016a, 2016b).
Third, as Hoang et al. (2016) have argued, as the number of banks decreases in the
post M&A era, the possibility of a monopoly occurring increases. This is of concern because
monopolies may damage the competitive atmosphere of the banking industry (Hoang
et al. 2016). In a monopolistic situation, some banks face much lower levels of competition,
while others face much higher levels of competition. This situation occurs because larger
banks control the market through offering better interest rates and loan terms; in contrast,
smaller banks cannot offer the same deals and consequently find it harder to attract and
retain customers. The larger bank group has greater market power and can charge higher
loan prices; hence they have higher levels of profit (Nguyen 2018). In short, large banks
have the potential to become monopolists.
There are limited studies to examine the existence of monopolists in the Vietnam
banking industry. Nguyen and Nghiem’s (2018) study is the only study that tests differences
in bank market power between Vietnam’s state-owned and joint stock domestic banks using
the Lerner index. The authors’ results reveal no significant difference in bank market power
between state-owned or joint stock banks. Their results indicate that neither state-owned
nor privately-owned banks are strong enough to become monopolists. In a competition
condition, larger banks have an advantage over smaller banks. In fact, they often acquire
smaller banks to maintain their dominant position in the market (Tabak et al. 2012; Wang
2015). In the Vietnam banking industry, there were 18 M&A deals from 1997 to 2015. Four
of the eighteen M&A transactions involved state-owned banks merging with joint stock
banks (Hoang et al. 2016). These mergers and acquisitions indicate that a high market
power bank group may exist. This group of banks includes state-owned banks and joint
stock banks. However, no study has examined whether a high market power bank group
exists in the Vietnam banking industry. In terms of performance, Nguyen and Nghiem
(2018) and Vu and Turnell (2010) tested the difference in bank performance between state-
owned or joint stock banks. The authors’ results show no significant differences in these
bank groups’ cost-efficiency (state-owned or joint stock banks). Therefore, it is necessary
to use a different approach to classify banks and test different bank market power and
performance.
Prior studies used different methodologies to classify companies. For examples,
Du Jardin and Séverin (2011, 2012) and Chen (2012) both used the self-organisation map
(SOM) technique, a type of artificial neural network (ANN), to chart trajectories that reflect
dynamic changes in a company’s finance. Chen (2012) noted that the SOM technique
can be used to categorise companies into super-classes: healthy companies and bankrupt
companies. Kohonen (1982) developed the SOM technique. The technique is comprised of
a set of units (nodes) that represent a set of neurons (Samarasinghe 2006). The neurons are
interconnected with neighbours by weights that expose the strength of the connection. A
SOM’s primary purpose is to group similar observations into clusters (Samarasinghe 2006).
After training, the input data separate into clusters: those with the highest similarity and
highest dissimilarity (Tsai and Chen 2010).
This study used the SOM technique to categorise Vietnam banks into super-class
groups. Applying the SOM technique is more suitable to categorise banks into groups
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because the SOM technique is different from other methods, as it does not distinguish
between state-owned and joint stock commercial banks. This study also examined the
dynamic financial status of Vietnam’s banks using the SOM trajectory technique. Tracking
bank financial trajectories is crucial because it enables experts to assess companies’ current
financial conditions and observe financial developments over time (Chen et al. 2013).
This study adds to the literature in several way. First, most previous studies on
bank market power and performance differentiate between state-owned and joint stock
commercial Vietnam banks (Nguyen and Nghiem 2018; Vu and Turnell 2010). However, this
research does not show any significant differences in bank market power and performance
between state-owned and joint stock commercial banks. This study used the SOM technique
to categorise Vietnam banks into super-class groups. This is the first study to use a
categorising methodology to examine differences in bank market power and performance
in the Vietnam banking industry. In addition, this is the first study to build financial
trajectories of the Vietnam banking industry.
Second, no study has tested differences in bank market power and performance of
various Vietnam bank groups (super-class bank groups) using the SOM trajectory technique.
This study fills this knowledge gap by comparing the market power (using the Lerner
index) and performance (using the cost-efficiency score) of the super-class bank groups in
Vietnam.
2. Literature Review
2.1. The SOM Technique for Tracking Financial Trajectories
Du Jardin and Séverin (2012) note that the major shortcoming of snap point forecasting
techniques (such as linear, nonlinear or classification regression) is that they have a horizon
time that is very short: it does not exceed one year. This presents a major problem when
evaluation is limited to a single year, but debt is repaid over a much longer period, such as
several years (Du Jardin and Séverin 2011). The reason is that the risk of a default borrower
or bankruptcy may transpire more than a year after evaluation. For example, company
executives might ask investors to give them more time to improve their financial health,
but, after the grace period, may find it impossible to recover, leading to bankruptcy. When
forecasting over one year, the accuracy of the snap point forecasting technique dramatically
decreases. For example, Altman’s model is 95% accurate in one-year forecasting but
accuracy drops to 48% for three-year forecasts (Du Jardin and Séverin 2011).
To overcome these limitations, researchers developed a combination technique that
uses SOM (or Kohonen map) to track a company’s financial trajectory, also known as the
SOM trajectory technique (Chen et al. 2013; Du Jardin and Séverin 2012). The primary
purpose of SOM is to improve the accuracy of the forecasting technique over a specific
period, not just the accuracy in snapshot forecasting (Du Jardin and Séverin 2011). There are
several advantages associated with using the SOM technique to build a financial trajectory.
First, the SOM trajectory is a user-friendly imagining technique for exploring financial
reports (Chen et al. 2013; Chen 2012). The SOM technique enables researchers/executives to
observe a company’s changing position on a trajectory; in short, the major difference is that
SOM allows a dynamic view of changed financial status rather than snapshot forecasting
(Chen 2012; Du Jardin and Séverin 2011).
Second, in the medium term, the SOM trajectory method has an advantage in that it
can forecast and detect financial threats (Du Jardin and Séverin 2011). This method enables
executives to measure their company’s financial health and take immediate corrective
actions (Chen et al. 2013). The technique also assists experts to identify downward financial
trends over time, and enables them to anticipate the risk of bankruptcy (Chen et al. 2013).
No studies have used the SOM trajectory technique to build the financial trajectories
of Vietnam banks. This study is the first to examine the financial status of Vietnam’s banks
using financial trajectory patterns. Moreover, this study is the first to use the SOM trajectory
technique to categorise Vietnam banks into super-class groups. It can be used to benchmark
market power and performance between these super-class bank groups.
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2.2. Measuring Bank Market Power
In the literature there are two common ways of quantifying bank competitiveness
levels: (1) the structural and (2) the non-structural approaches (Ab-Rahim 2017; Liu et al.
2012). The structural model is based on the “structure–conduct–performance” and “effi-
cient structure” theories (Ab-Rahim 2017). Both theories argue that market concentration
determines the level of competition in the market (Adjei-Frimpong et al. 2016). These
theories assume that banks in markets which are composed of a few large players can offer
a higher price for their financial products than banks in markets that have many players
(Liu et al. 2012). The structural approach often uses the Herfindahl–Hirschman (HHI) index
or the concentration (CRk) score to assess the level of competition (Nguyen and Nghiem
2018; Nguyen et al. 2016b).
The non-structural model basically depends on the New Empirical Industrial Or-
ganisation Theory (NEIO) to evaluate levels of bank competition in emerging markets
(Nguyen 2018; Nguyen and Nghiem 2018). The non-structural approach assumes that
entering/exiting fencing rules and existing players (or banks) will affect the competitive
environment (Liu et al. 2012). Under this approach, indicators used to determine competi-
tion levels include the H-statistic, the Lerner index and the Boone index (Nguyen 2018;
Nguyen and Nghiem 2018; Nguyen et al. 2016b). The major disadvantage of the H-statistic
and the Boone index is that both indicators do not measure market power continuously
(Nguyen and Nghiem 2018). This is because estimating these indicators requires data from
the whole study period to enable identification of different types of competition (such as
monopolistic competition, a monopoly or perfect competition) (Nguyen 2018; Nguyen
and Nghiem 2018). In contrast, the Lerner index indicates market power at a continuous,
individual level (Adjei-Frimpong et al. 2016; Nguyen and Nghiem 2018). The Lerner
index represents market power, whereby higher market power suggests lower levels of
competition (Nguyen et al. 2016b). The Lerner index has the following advantages:
• Compared with other concentration measures that evaluate competition at the industry
level, the Lerner index can be used to appraise each bank or provide a continuous
measurement for each year (Abel and Roux 2017; Nguyen and Nghiem 2018). Hence,
the results can be used as a responding variable in a subsequent analysis to evaluate
the determinants that impact upon bank power (Delis and Pagoulatos 2009).
• The indicator also reflects an individual bank’s profitability because the indicator is
measured by the change in the ‘output price-cost margin’ divided by output price
(Nguyen 2018). The ‘output price-cost margin’ can be used to assess profitability.
Hence, higher bank market power implies higher profitability.
As a result of these advantages, scholars have used the Lerner index to quantify the
market power of Vietnam’s banks (see for example, Nguyen 2018; Nguyen and Nghiem
2018; Nguyen et al. 2016b). While Nguyen and Nghiem’s (2018) study is the only one that
tests differences in market power between commercial state and joint stock Vietnam banks,
their results show that this is insignificant. No study has evaluated the market power of
various bank groups (the super-class bank groups) using the SOM trajectory technique.
This study thus compares the market power of the super-class bank groups in Vietnam
using the Lerner index.
2.3. Measuring Bank Performance
Bank performance is of interest to bank executives and policymakers, as well as
academic researchers (Kočišová 2014; Nguyen et al. 2016a). This is because the banking
industry has a central role in national development (Nguyen et al. 2016a). Efficient banks
stabilise the banking industry and a nation’s monetary system (Kočišová 2014). Moreover,
bank executives are always interested in benchmarking or comparing their bank’s per-
formance with the top operating bank to improve their operations (Nguyen et al. 2016a).
Cost-efficiency (CE) is commonly used to quantify bank performance. The CE method
is employed to capture how banks manage their costs compared with the optimal costs
produced by best-practice banks (Kočišová 2014).
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SFA and DEA are two common methods applied to quantify bank performance
(Ab-Rahim 2017; Kočišová 2014). SFA is a parametric technique that generates a function of
the expense, income or production (Ab-Rahim 2017). The function defines the relationships
between inputs, outputs and environmental factors. In contrast, DEA is a non-parametric
technique that uses a linear programme to estimate bank efficiency (Ab-Rahim 2017; Barth
et al. 2013). The DEA technique has several advantages over the SFA method:
• In comparison to SFA, DEA performs well with small sample sizes. This is because
the SFA method is a statistical method that needs a huge dataset to create unbiased
estimate coefficients (Adjei-Frimpong et al. 2014; Gardener et al. 2011).
• The SFA method uses a mathematical formula to measure efficiency. The accuracy of
the efficiency scores depends on the suitability of the chosen mathematical formula
(Barth et al. 2013). In contrast, the DEA technique uses the linear programme approach
to predict efficiency scores. In short, researchers using the DEA technique do not have
to choose a functional form (Barth et al. 2013).
Researchers have measured bank performance in Vietnam using the DEA method (see
for example, Gardener et al. 2011; Nguyen et al. 2014, 2016a). Other scholars have used
the SFA method (see for example, Nguyen and Nghiem 2018; Nguyen et al. 2016b). This
study uses DEA method to measure bank performance. The DEA method uses a linear
programme to measure efficiency scores on single and individual observations (Barth et al.
2013). Thus, DEA can identify efficient units or the best practice units. This method also
specifies inefficient units and assists in improving inefficient units (Adjei-Frimpong et al.
2014). In addition, our dataset consists of 258 observations, a relatively small dataset. The
SFA method is inappropriate because it can generate biased estimate coefficients because
of a small dataset. Therefore, the DEA is the best choice to avoid prior problems associated
with the SFA method (Adjei-Frimpong et al. 2014; Nguyen et al. 2014).
The non-parametric DEA method performs under the constant return to scale (CRS)
assumption (Nguyen et al. 2014). However, the DEA method has been modified under
the variable return to scale (VRS) assumption (Kočišová 2014). The VRS assumes that
banks work at a less than optimal/efficient scale because of an imperfectly competitive
atmosphere, facing economic constraints and a strict regulatory system (Adjei-Frimpong
et al. 2014; Nguyen et al. 2014). Vu and Turnell (2010) note that the Vietnam commercial
state and joint stock banks need to reduce their costs to achieve optimal size and be more
cost-efficient (Vu and Turnell 2010). Nguyen et al. (2014) contend that Vietnam banks may
include some inefficient scale of banks. Thus, the CRS assumption is not a suitable option
for measuring the efficiency of Vietnam banks. To avoid the impact of suboptimal scales in
several banks, we use the VRS assumption.
No study has compared the cost-efficiency scores of Vietnam banks within super-class
groups (as categorised by the SOM trajectory technique). This study fills this knowledge
gap, using the paired t-test to compare efficiency scores (measured by DEA) within the
super-class bank groups.
3. Data and Methodology
3.1. Data Information
As Nadeem et al. (2017) argue, panel data, which cover fewer than 10 years, may
generate biased results. This is because statistical conclusions cannot be realised if the
data study period is too short (Vu and Turnell 2010). For this study, our bank data is from
2008 to 2017 to ensure a 10-year study period. Bank financial data were obtained from the
Bloomberg database and bank websites. Macroeconomic indicators, such as the GDP and
the inflation rate, were sourced from the World Bank database.
Five of the listed banks did not provide financial data during the period: PVcom
bank, Seabank, Bao Viet bank, Co-op Bank and Vietcapital bank. In addition, several
banks had missing data. SCB did not provide data in 2011. The Bac-A bank had no
financial data from 2008 to 2010. Vietbank only had data from 2016 and 2017. Thus, there
were only 27 banks with unbalanced panel data (258 observations) over the study period.
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The 27 banks represent approximately 85% of the Vietnam banking industry. This study
excluded data from the nine foreign-owned banks (HSBC, Standard Chartered, ANZ,
Shinhan Bank, Public Bank Bhd, Hong Leong Bank, Woori, UOB and CIMB).
3.2. Methodology
3.2.1. Developing Financial Trajectories Using the SOM Technique
This section describes the SOM technique used to track bank financial trajectory
patterns. The unsupervised SOM technique is a feed-forward ANN that includes input
and output layers (Chen et al. 2013; Samarasinghe 2006). The output neural layer is usually
a low-dimension grid; that is, a one- or two-dimensional grid. Each unit of the input layer
is linked to all neurons in the output layer by weight. Appendix B.1 shows the training
process for the SOM with n-neurons (input layer) and m-neurons (output layer). This study
used the same methodology as Chen’s (2012) study to investigate Vietnam banks’ financial
trajectory patterns. Building the trajectory included static and dynamic phases as follows.
In the static phase, Vietnam banks’ financial statement data from every year (2008–
2017) were screened using the SOM technique. After screening, each bank was located
within specific neurons in the 2D SOM map. Each year was given a different 2D SOM map
to represent a bank’s location. Cluster analysis was applied to optimise groups of neurons.
In the dynamic phase, ten 2D SOM maps from every year were overlapped into one
2D map. Bank locations revealed changes over time. For example, bank A, which was
in group 1 in year 1, moved to group 2 in year 2 and group 2 in year 3. Therefore, bank
A’s trajectory was determined by connecting the bank’s location from year 1 to year 3. By
observing the trajectory of every bank in the banking industry, we identified trajectory
patterns as well as categorised the banks into super-class groups (Chen 2012; Du Jardin
and Séverin 2011).
3.2.2. Measuring Vietnam Banks’ Market Power
Our study used the non-structural Lerner index to quantify the market power of
Vietnam’s domestic banks. The Lerner index reveals the changes between the price the
banks charge (interest rate and fees) and their marginal cost (MC) of total assets. This






where: Pit = price output of the bank at time t, which is computed using total revenue (non-
interest income plus interest income), divided by total asset value; and MCit = marginal
cost of ith bank at time t that is determined using the derivative of the translog-cost function
(see Appendix B.2).
The Lerner index values range from −1 to 1. If a bank’s Lerner index is closer to 1,
this indicates that the bank has greater market power and is considered a monopolist bank.
In contrast, if the Lerner index is closer to zero, this implies greater competition. A value of
0 indicates perfect competition. When the Lerner index is negative, this indicates that a
bank has reduced their prices to below cost due to external influences, such as economic
crises (Abel and Roux 2017). After the market power of each Vietnam bank (represented by
the Lerner index score) was determined at time t using Equation (1), the paired t-test was
employed to compare the different market powers of the super-class bank groups.
3.2.3. Measuring Vietnam Bank Performance
Our study used the DEA technique with the VRS assumption to compute bank perfor-
mance. The CE score was used to determine the performance of each individual bank. CE
scores were calculated using a linear programme (see Appendix B.3). This scores ranged
from 0 to 1. Banks with higher CE scores have higher cost-efficiency. After the domestic
bank performance score was calculated for each bank at time t, the paired t-test was used
to compare the different CE scores within the super-class groups of Vietnam banks.
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4. Results
4.1. Financial Trajectories and Categorising Vietnam Banks Using the SOM Technique
4.1.1. Using the SOM Technique to Detect Banks’ Financial Locations in 2D SOM Maps
The first step in determining a bank’s trajectory involves locating it within a 2-
dimensional (2D) SOM map, based on the bank’s financial information. Appendix A
Table A2 summarises Vietnam domestic banks’ financial data over the study period. The
R program (Version 3.4.2) with Wehrens and Buydens (2007) library “Kohonen” software
package was used to perform the SOM technique (R Core Team 2017). All banks’ financial
data in the balance sheet report are used as input variables for SOM technique. These
variables are selected based on prior studies (Chen 2012; Chen et al. 2013; Du Jardin and
Séverin 2011, 2012).
The SOM 4 × 4 grid was selected to capture the bank’s locations. The ‘hexagonal’
structure was chosen because it results in more neighbouring networks (Samarasinghe
2006). The SOM was trained repeatedly with 100 iterations and a learning rate between 0.01
to 0.02. The Euclidean distance was used to decide the winning neuron and the Gaussian
neighbourhood function was used to alter weight smoothly across distance. This procedure
was repeated multiple times until the SOM was thoroughly trained. The training processes
(for the period of 2008 to 2017) showed that the mean distance reached a maximum and
dropped to the minimum (see Appendix A Figure A1). These outcomes indicated that the
4 × 4 neuron grid was closest to the data information. As a result, the final SOM maps
show the locations of Vietnam’s domestic banks in the 2D maps (see Figure 1). There were
some empty neurons and some neurons that contain many banks. In short, the SOM results
provide a clear picture of which banks are categorised into each specific neuron.
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banks). Group one is a super-class bank group (named group one). In short, super-class 
bank groups one and two represent two clusters of 16 neurons; in total, these represent a 
total of 27 banks. There were only commercial joint stock banks in group one. Group two 
contained four commercial state banks and several joint stock banks. The mean total assets 
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for group two banks (see Appendix A Table A3). In other words, group two banks were 
larger (have greater total assets) than group one banks. 
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were overlapped on each other. Each bank was observed and connected from neuron to 
neuron or group to group, to find its specific trajectory. The trajectory pattern results are 
shown in Figure 2. Table 1 shows how Vietnam domestic banks are located within super-
class groups one and two for the period of 2008 to 2017. Some banks remained in the same 
group over the entire study period. Ten banks maintained their position in group one 
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Bank, PGbank and Saigonbank. Similarly, there were nine banks in group two banks: 
Figure 1. The 2D SOM map results separating Vietnam banks into categories at each specific neuron and group for the
period 2008 to 2017. Note: orange, purple, red, brown, green and blue indicate groups 1 to 6. Source: author’s computation.
Sixteen neurons were categorised into six groups. These six groups are shown in
orange, purple, red, brown, green and blue (see Figure 1). The mean within group sum of
squares (WSS) was used to select the optimum number of clusters. The optimum clusters
were chosen as the cluster that had the largest change in WSS value (Waidyarathne and
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Samarasinghe 2014). The WSS value dropped dramatically when the number of clusters
increased from one to two (see Appendix A Figure A2). This suggested that the 16 neurons
should be categorised into two clusters. The dendrograms also suggested that groups two
to six should be grouped into one cluster (see Appendix A Figure A3). As a consequence,
groups two to six were clustered to create a super-class group of banks (named group two
banks). Group one is a super-class bank group (named group one). In short, super-class
bank groups one and two represent two clusters of 16 neurons; in total, these represent a
total of 27 banks. There were only commercial joint stock banks in group one. Group two
contained four commercial state banks and several joint stock banks. The mean total assets
over the 10 years was 38,053 billion VND for group one banks and 280,194 billion VND for
group two banks (see Appendix A Table A3). In other words, group two banks were larger
(have greater total assets) than group one banks.
4.1.2. Dynamic Evaluation Phase
In the second step, ten 2D mapping plots (see Figure 1) for the period 2008 to 2017 were
overlapped on each other. Each bank was observed and connected from neuron to neuron
or group to group, to find its specific trajectory. The trajectory pattern results are shown
in Figure 2. Table 1 shows how Vietnam domestic banks are located within super-class
groups one and two for the period of 2008 to 2017. Some banks remained in the same group
over the entire study period. Ten banks maintained their position in group one banks:
BacAbank, ABBank, NVB, OCB, Viet A bank, Nam A Bank, Vietbank, KienLongBank,
PGbank and Saigonbank. Similarly, there were nine banks in group two banks: these are
BIDV, Agribank, Vietinbank, VCB, SCB, Sacombank, Mbbank, Techcombank and ACB (see
Figure 2 and Table 1). However, five banks shifted positions from group one banks to
group two banks: SHB, VPBank, HDBank, LienVietPostbank and Eximbank. Conversely,
SHB, VPBank, HDBank. LienVietPostbank and Eximbank which were in group one banks
(from 2008 to 2011) moved to group two banks (from 2012 to 2017).




Figure 2. Final trajectory patterns of Vietnam banks for the period 2008 to 2017. Note: ‘1’ = super-class group 1 bank; ‘2’ = 
super-class group 2 bank; 2.2 to 2.6 = groups 2 to 6 are classified as super-class group 2 banks. Source: author’s computa-
tion. 
Table 1. Bank group one and two results for the sampled banks for the period 2008 to 2017. 
  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012  2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
BIDV  2 2 2 2 2  2 2 2 2 2 
Agribank  2 2 2 2 2  2 2 2 2 2 
Vietinbank  2 2 2 2 2  2 2 2 2 2 
VCB  2 2 2 2 2  2 2 2 2 2 
SCB  2 2 2 n.a 2  2 2 2 2 2 
Sacombank  2 2 2 2 2  2 2 2 2 2 
Mbbank  2 2 2 2 2  2 2 2 2 2 
Techcombank  2 2 2 2 2  2 2 2 2 2 
SHB  2 1 1 2 2  2 2 2 2 2 
ACB  2 2 2 2 2  2 2 2 2 2 
VPBank  2 1 1 2 2  2 2 2 2 2 
HDBank  1 1 1 2 2  2 2 2 2 2 
LienViet  1 1 1 2 2  2 2 2 2 2 
Eximbank  1 2 2 2 2  2 2 2 2 2 
TPBank  1 1 1 1 2  1 1 1 1 1 
VIB  2 2 2 2 2  1 1 1 1 1 
Maritimebank  2 2 2 2 2  1 1 1 1 1 
BacAbank   n.a.  1 1  1 1 1 1 1 
ABBank  1 1 1 1 1  1 1 1 1 1 
NVB  1 1 1 1 1  1 1 1 1 1 
Figure 2. Final trajectory patterns of Vietnam banks for the period 2008 to 2017. Note: ‘1’ = super-class
group 1 bank; ‘2’ = super-class group 2 bank; 2.2 to 2.6 = groups 2 to 6 are classified as super-class
group 2 banks. Source: author’s computation.
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Table 1. Bank group one and two results for the sampled banks for the period 2008 to 2017.
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
BIDV 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Agribank 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Vietinbank 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
VCB 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
SCB 2 2 2 n.a 2 2 2 2 2 2
Sacombank 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Mbbank 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Techcombank 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
SHB 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
ACB 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
VPBank 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
HDBank 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
LienViet 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Eximbank 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
TPBank 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1
VIB 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1
Maritimebank 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1
BacAbank n.a. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ABBank 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
NVB 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
OCB 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Viet A bank 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Nam A Bank 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Vietbank n.a. 1 1
KienLongBank 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
PGbank 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Saigonbank 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Note: n.a. = not available. ‘1’= group 1 banks; ‘2’ = group 2 banks. Source: author’s analysis.
4.2. Measuring Market Power for Group One and Two Banks
Our study used the non-structural Lerner index to assess the market power of Vietnam
domestic banks. Appendix A Table A4 lists the financial information used to quantify the
Lerner index for the period of 2008 to 2017. Data were analysed using STATA software
(version R15) (StataCorp 2017). The Lerner index results are displayed in Table 2.
Table 2. The Lerner index values of Vietnam’s domestic banks for the period 2008 to 2017.
Year No. of
Banks
All Group 2 Banks Group 1 Banks
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
2008 25 0.185 0.167 0.226 0.153 0.140 0.176
2009 25 0.246 0.090 0.271 0.101 0.222 0.075
2010 25 0.236 0.080 0.261 0.083 0.213 0.071
2011 25 0.209 0.083 0.240 0.063 0.161 0.090
2012 26 0.173 0.089 0.196 0.081 0.130 0.092
2013 26 0.176 0.100 0.213 0.106 0.132 0.074
2014 26 0.209 0.108 0.260 0.098 0.150 0.089
2015 26 0.215 0.106 0.274 0.101 0.147 0.064
2016 27 0.216 0.118 0.274 0.118 0.154 0.085
2017 27 0.237 0.124 0.302 0.125 0.167 0.079
Mean 0.210 0.107 0.252 0.103 0.162 0.090
Note: S.D. = standard deviation. Source: author’s computation.
The average Lerner index score of Vietnam domestic banks for the period of 2008
to 2017 was 0.210 (see Table 2). The Lerner index score increased slightly in 2016 and
2017 (0.216 and 0.237, respectively). A slight increase in the overall Lerner index implies
a decline in bank competition. This decline in bank competition could be because of the
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decreasing number of Vietnam domestic banks, from 43 banks in 2008 to 32 banks in 2017.
Fewer banks could lead to less competition and greater bank market power. This result is
similar to those found in previous studies, which have identified increased Lerner index
values: Demirguc-Kunt and Martínez-Pería’s (2010) study of Jordanian banking industry
and Adjei-Frimpong et al.’s (2016) study of the Ghanaian banking industry.
Figure 3 shows the Lerner index scores for both group one and two banks for the
period of 2008 to 2017. The average Lerner score of group one banks was higher than
both the average group two banks’ Lerner scores and the average for all banks for the
period from 2008 to 2017 (see Figure 3a). The average Lerner index for group two banks
was 0.252, which was higher than group one banks (0.162) by approximately 56% (see
Figure 3b). This outcome implies that group two banks are stronger (or have greater
market power) than group one banks. The paired t-test was used to examine the statistical
significance of the difference in the Lerner indexes between group one and two banks. The
null hypothesis (H0) is that the mean difference in the Lerner indexes between groups one
and two banks is zero. The t-test results were statistically significant at the 1% level (t-value
equals −6.83). This result indicates a rejection of the null hypothesis. In other words, there
was a statistically significant difference in bank market power between group one and
two banks.
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4.3. Measuring the Efficiency of Group One and Two Banks
The non-parametric DEA technique under the VRS assumption was used to compute
bank performance (represented by CE scores). Appendix A Table A5 provides the statistical
data used to compute CE scores for the period of 2008 to 2017. The dataset was estimated
using the R program (version 3.4.2) with the “Benchmarking” package (R Core Team 2017).
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Bogetoft and Otto’s (2018) “Benchmarking” software package was employed to estimate
CE scores using the DEA method. Table 3 shows the CE scores of the banks. The mean CE
score was 0.855, which indicates that Vietnam domestic banks could reduce their costs by
14.5% (from 100% to 85.5%), while maintaining the same outputs.
Table 3. CE scores for Vietnam banks (for the period 2008–2017).
Year No. of
Banks
All Banks Group 2 Group 1
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
2008 25 0.872 0.133 0.885 0.138 0.858 0.133
2009 25 0.923 0.083 0.934 0.087 0.913 0.082
2010 25 0.940 0.098 0.944 0.097 0.937 0.104
2011 25 0.732 0.253 0.786 0.254 0.675 0.249
2012 26 0.888 0.147 0.909 0.160 0.849 0.117
2013 26 0.838 0.143 0.847 0.147 0.827 0.145
2014 26 0.856 0.140 0.872 0.127 0.838 0.158
2015 26 0.882 0.130 0.866 0.134 0.901 0.127
2016 27 0.795 0.154 0.772 0.165 0.819 0.142
2017 27 0.824 0.160 0.770 0.176 0.882 0.123
Mean 0.855 0.144 0.858 0.148 0.850 0.138
Note: S.D. = standard deviation. Source: author’s computation.
Figure 4 show the CE scores for the two groups of banks. The mean CE scores for both
groups of banks were quite similar (see Figure 4a). The average CE score for group two
banks was 0.858: this is 1% higher than the average CE score of group one banks (0.850)
(see Figure 4b). The paired t-test was used to test the difference between the CE scores for
the two groups of banks. The null hypothesis (H0) was that the difference of CE scores
between group one and two banks would equal zero. The t-value was insignificant at all
conventional levels. The p-values of the paired CE tests was 0.5817. These results confirm
the null hypothesis. In short, the differences in CE scores for groups one and two banks
were insignificant. These findings echo previous studies (Nguyen and Nghiem 2018; Vu
and Turnell 2010). The authors found no significant differences between the CE scores of
commercial state-owned and joint stock banks in Vietnam.
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5. Conclusions and Policy Implications
This study used the SOM technique to categorise Vietnam domestic banks into two
super-class groups (one and two). While differences in the Lerner scores (which represent
market power) between the two super-class bank groups (one and two) were statistically
significant at the 1% level, the CE scores (which represent performance) were the same.
The different market power between group one and two banks contradict Nguyen and
Nghiem’s (2018) results. This study shows that the SOM technique (with an unsupervised
algorithm) can better capture differences in bank market power and thus can be used to
divide Vietnam domestic banks into two groups, consisting of weak banks (group one)
and strong banks (group two). Using the SOM technique provides academics with a new
approach, which is based on an unsupervised algorithm. This is different from previous
studies, which have divided domestic Vietnam banks into commercial state and joint stock
banks (Nguyen and Nghiem 2018; Vu and Turnell 2010). Hence, this study has argued that
two groups of banks with different levels of market power exist side-by-side in the Vietnam
banking industry. The group of strong banks tends to be monopolists. The existence of
these two groups of banks (weak and strong banks) indicates that the competitive domestic
banking environment in Vietnam may be at risk. The reason is that group two banks may
be more profitable due to greater market power, whereas group one banks may struggle to
cut costs to remain viable.
Group two banks (the larger banks) occupy the dominant position in this environment
and will continue to expand (Tabak et al. 2012; Wang 2015). In such an environment, group
two banks may end up acquiring group one banks. This explains why the number of
banks reduced from 43 to 32 over the study period of 2008 to 2017. Policymakers and
regulators must take this phenomenon (group two banks acquiring group one banks) into
consideration when issuing policies in order to maintain an optimal number of banks to
ensure the stability and competitiveness of the Vietnam banking system. As Le (2014) notes,
the ideal number of banks to achieve stability in the Vietnam banking system is between
15 and 17. In 2017, there were 32 banks. To meet the ideal number, half would need to be
merged.
Our SOM results showed that 70% of Vietnam banks (19 of 27 banks) maintained
their positions, either in super-class group one or two banks. This result indicates that
banks tend to maintain their financial position in the industry, and that bank market power
persists over time. This fact indicates the existence of some rigidity in the banking industry,
which may make it difficult for weak banks to compete. Future research could consider
whether bank market power persists over a long period of time. These findings will help
policymakers and regulators avoid rigidity and ensure an efficient and competitive banking
environment.
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Appendix A
Table A1. List of domestic Vietnam banks for the period 2008 to 2017.
No Name
1 Bank for Investment and Development of Vietnam (BIDV)
2 Vietnam Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (Agribank)
3 Vietnam Bank for Industry and Trade (Vietinbank)
4 Joint Stock Commercial Bank for Foreign Trade of Vietnam (VCB)
5 Sai Gon Joint Stock Commercial Bank (SCB)
6 Saigon Thuong Tin Commercial Joint Stock Bank (Sacombank)
7 Military Commercial Joint Stock Bank (MBBank)
8 Vietnam Technological and Commercial Joint- stock Bank (Techcombank)
9 Saigon Hanoi Commercial Joint Stock Bank (SHB)
10 Asia Commercial Bank (ACB)
11 Vietnam Prosperity Joint-Stock Commercial Bank (VPBank)
12 Ho Chi Minh Development Joint Stock Commercial Bank (HDbank)
13 LienViet Post Joint Stock Commercial Bank (LienVietPostBank)
14 Vietnam Commercial Joint Stock Export Import Bank (Eximbank)
15 Vietnam Public Joint Stock Commercial Bank (PVcom bank)
16 Tien Phong Commercial Joint Stock Bank (TPBank)
17 Vietnam International Commercial Joint Stock Bank (VIB)
18 Southeast Asia Commercial Joint Stock Bank (SeABank)
19 Vietnam Maritime Commercial Stock Bank (Maritime Bank)
20 Bac A Commercial Joint Stock Bank (BacABank)
21 An Binh Commercial Joint Stock Bank (ABBank)
22 National Citizen Commercial Joint Stock Bank (NCB Bank)
23 Orient Commercial Joint Stock Bank (OCB Bank)
24 Viet A Joint Stock Commercial Bank (VietABank)
25 Nam A Commercial Joint Stock Bank (NamABank)
26 BaoViet Commercial Joint Stock Bank (Bao Viet Bank)
27 Vietnam Thuong Tin Commercial Joint Stock Bank (Viet Bank)
28 Kien Long Commercial Joint Stock Bank (KienLongBank)
29 Viet Capital Joint Stock Commercial Bank (Vietcapital Bank)
30 The Co-operative Bank of Vietnam (Co-opbank)
31 Petrolimex Group Commercial Joint Stock Bank (PG Bank)
32 Saigon Bank for Industry and Trade (Saigonbank)
Note: several Vietnam banks which ceased operating in the Vietnam banking industry during the study period
(2008–2017) are excluded from this study. Source: The State Bank of Vietnam (2018); Hoang et al. (2016).
Table A2. Summary data information for the sample banks (for the period 2008 to 2017) used to track bank trajectory
patterns.
Variables Unit Mean SD Min Max
Total Asset (Billion VND) 169,939 227,929 2419 1,202,283
Owner’s Equity (Billion VND) 11,723 12,729 1021 63,765
Customer Deposits (Billion VND) 129,626 191,075 1172 1,011,314
Charter Capital (Billion VND) 8702 8406 1000 37,324
Customer Loans (Billion VND) 107,035 167,294 275 863,575
Operating Income (Billion VND) 5704 8002 122 42,680
Operating Expenses (Billion VND) 2752 3780 33 19,100
Income before Provision for Credit
Losses (Billion VND) 2934 4391 −1278 23,581
Provision for Credit Losses (Billion VND) 1346 2581 −564 18,515
Profit before Tax (EBIT) (Billion VND) 1593 2196 −1856 11,341
Profit after Tax (EAT) (Billion VND) 1234 1728 −1909 9091
Return on Asset (ROA) % 0.95% 0.93% −5.51% 8.00%
Return on Equity (ROE) % 9.47% 7.46% 45.75% 36.02%
Non-performance Loans Value (Billion VND) 2373 4382 0 27,866
Non-performance Loans Ratio % 2.25% 1.49% 0.00% 11.40%
Source: author’s computation.
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Table A3. Summary mean asset values for super-class group one and group two banks.
Asset Value Unit Value
All banks Mean (Billion VND) 168,001
Standard Deviation (Billion VND) 201,038
Group 2 banks Mean (Billion VND) 280,194
Standard Deviation (Billion VND) 220,089
Group 1 banks Mean (Billion VND) 38,053
Standard Deviation (Billion VND) 19,424
Note: this table shows mean asset values of Vietnam domestic banks (group 2 a d group 1 banks). Source:
author’s calculations.
Table A4. The financial data used to compute the Lerner index of Vietnam banks (2008–2017).
Variables Obs Mean SD Min Max
Total Costs TC Billion VND 258 10,873 13,659 106 66,993
Total Assets Q Billion VND 258 169,857 227,337 2419 1,202,284
Total Revenue TR VND 258 13,795 17,505 5 88 560
Price of Staff Cost w1 258 0.0078 0.0028 0.0031 0.0184
Price of Deposits w2 258 0.0851 0.0455 0.0316 0.3927
Price of Capital w3 258 1.0500 1.3496 0.0792 17.3288
Note: Obs = observation; SD = standard deviation. Source: author’s computation.
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Table A5. Summary statistics of the financial data used to compute Vietnam bank efficiency (2008–2017).
Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max
Total Deposits x1 Billion VND 258 128,325 189,744 1172 1,011,314
Labour (Staff Costs) x2 Billion VND 258 1424 2112 20 11,195
Fixed Assets x3 Billion VND 258 1823 2272 46 11,437
Loans y1 Billion VND 258 105,912 165,211 275 863,575
Other Earning Assets y2 Billion VND 258 51,451 61,186 542 462,597
Price of staff cost w1 258 0.0078 0.0028 0.0031 0.0184
Price of Deposits w2 258 0.0851 0.0455 0.0316 0.3927
Price of Capital w3 258 1.0500 1.3496 0.0792 17.3288
Note: Obs = observation; SD = standard deviation. Source: author’s computation.
Appendix B
Appendix B.1. The Training Process of the SOM Technique for N-Input Neurons and M-Output
Neurons
The training process is to (Chen 2012):
1. Randomly initialise the weight vectors wi for all neurons i = 1, ..., m;
2. Choose an input vector x: x = [x1, x2, x3, . . . , xn];
3. Compare x with weights wi in each neuron i to decide the winner. The winning vector
is the one nearest to the input vector or which has the smallest Euclidean distance
(see Equation (A1)).
||wk − x|| = mini ||wi − x|| (Euclidean distance) (A1)
4. Update the winning node so that the winner becomes closer to x, together with
neighbours around the winner. Weight vectors of the neighbourhood (‘neurons i’) of
the winner (‘neuron k’) are updated as follows (see Equation (A2))
wi = wi + µ · ϕ (i, k) · (x − wi) (A2)
where: µ learning rate; ϕ (i, k) = neighbourhood function, a Gaussian function is often
used.
5. Repeat steps (2) to (4) until the map has converged (that is, the weights of neurons do
not change), or a pre-defined number of epoch trainings has been reached.
Appendix B.2. Computing the Marginal Cost Using the Derivative Function of the Translog Cost
Formula
The MC of the ith bank at time t is determined using the derivative function of the
translog cost formula, which is expressed as follows (Demirguc-Kunt and Martínez-Pería
2010):
Ln(Cit) = a0 + b0Ln(Qit) + b10.5[Ln(Qit)]
2 + a1Ln(W1it) + a2Ln(W2it) + a3Ln(W3it) +
b20.5Ln(Qit)× Ln(W1it) + b30.5Ln(Qit)× Ln(W2it) + b40.5Ln(Qit)× Ln(W3it) +





d1Trend + d2Trend2 + d3Trend × Ln(Qit) + d4Trend × Ln(W1it)
d5Trend × Ln(W2it) + d6Trend × Ln(W3it) + uit
(A3)
where: Cit = the total cost of the ith bank at time t computed using total operating expenses
plus interest expenses; Qit = the total assets of the ith bank at time t; W1it = the unit price of
staff costs of the bank at time t computed using staff costs divided by total assets; W2it =
the unit price of funding of the bank at time t calculated using interest expenses divided
by deposits; W3it = the unit price of capitalisation of the ith bank at time t calculated using
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working expenses, deducting staff costs and dividing by fixed assets; Trend = the time
trend which captures technical change; and = the coefficients to be estimated.
The banks were not randomly chosen. Therefore, a fixed-effect estimator is used to
predict the coefficients of the Equation (A3) (Adjei-Frimpong et al. 2016; Nguyen and
Nghiem 2018).
The MCit of the ith bank (at time t) is estimated using the first derivative of Equa-




[a0 + b1Ln(Qit) + b20.5Ln(w1it) + b30.5Ln(w2it) + b40.5Ln(w3it) + d3Trend] (A4)
The coefficients a0, b1, b2, b3,b4, d3 are estimated from Equation (A3) and plugged into
Equation (A4) to compute (MCit) of the ith bank at time t.
Appendix B.3. Calculating the CE Score Using the DEA Technique




















λj ≥ 0 j = 1, 2, · · · n
(A5)
where: wiq = an input price of DMUq; and x∗iq = the frontier or cost-minimising unit
of DMUq, given input prices wiq and output yrq; x∗iq is calculated by solving the linear
program.




is computed as a





Therefore, cost-efficiency, as outlined in Equation (A6), assesses the difference between
a bank’s actual operating cost (in relation to the best/or minimum cost in the market),
given the input price and outputs (Kočišová 2014). CE has a value between zero and one.
If CE = 1 for DMUq, it means that Bankq is cost-efficient. If CE < 1 for DMUq, the Bankq is
inefficient. The value (1 − CE) for the Bankq is also important. This number indicates the
cost that the Bankq can collect in producing the same output with a given input (Nguyen
et al. 2016a).
References
Abel, Sanderson, and Pierre le Roux. 2017. Evaluating Market Power in the Zimbabwean Banking Sector. Journal of Economic and
Financial Sciences 10: 274–91. [CrossRef]
Ab-Rahim, Rossazana. 2017. Efficiency and Competition in the Malaysian Banking Market: Foreign versus Domestic Banks. Gadjah
Mada International Journal of Business 19: 193–221. [CrossRef]
Adjei-Frimpong, Kofi, Christopher Gan, and Baiding Hu. 2014. Cost efficiency of Ghana’s banking industry: A panel data analysis. The
International Journal of Business and Finance Research 8: 69–86.
Adjei-Frimpong, Kofi, Christopher Gan, and Baiding Hu. 2016. Competition in the banking industry: Empirical evidence from Ghana.
Journal of Banking Regulation 17: 159–75. [CrossRef]
Angelini, Paolo, and Nicola Cetorelli. 2003. The Effects of Regulatory Reform on Competition in the Banking Industry. Journal of Money,
Credit, and Banking 35: 663–84. [CrossRef]
J. Risk Financial Manag. 2021, 14, 485 18 of 18
Barth, James R., Chen Lin, Yue Ma, Jesús Seade, and Frank M. Song. 2013. Do bank regulation, supervision and monitoring enhance or
impede bank efficiency. Journal of Banking & Finance 37: 2879–92.
Bogetoft, Peter, and Lars Otto. 2018. Benchmarking with DEA and SFA, R Package Version 0.27. Berlin: Springer Science & Business Media.
Chen, Mu-Yen. 2012. Visualization and dynamic evaluation model of corporate financial structure with self-organizing map and
support vector regression. Applied Soft Computing 12: 2274–88. [CrossRef]
Chen, Ning, Bernardete Ribeiro, Armando Vieira, and An Chen. 2013. Clustering and visualization of bankruptcy trajectory using
self-organizing map. Expert Systems with Applications 40: 385–93. [CrossRef]
Delis, Manthos D., and George Pagoulatos. 2009. Bank Competition, Institutional Strength and Financial Reforms in Central and Eastern
Europe and the EU. MPRA Paper 16494. Munich: University Library of Munich.
Demirguc-Kunt, Asli, and María Soledad Martínez-Pería. 2010. A Framework for Analyzing Competition in the Banking Sector: An
Application to the Case of Jordan. Policy Research Working Paper Series 5499; Washington, DC: The World Bank.
Du Jardin, Philippe, and Eric Séverin. 2011. Predicting corporate bankruptcy using a self-organizing map: An empirical study to
improve the forecasting horizon of a financial failure model. Decision Support Systems 51: 701–11. [CrossRef]
Du Jardin, Philippe, and Eric Séverin. 2012. Forecasting financial failure using a Kohonen map: A comparative study to improve model
stability over time. European Journal of Operational Research 221: 378–96. [CrossRef]
Fernández de Guevara, Juan, Joaquín Maudos, and Francisco Pérez. 2005. Market Power in European Banking Sectors. Journal of
Financial Services Research 27: 109–37. [CrossRef]
Gardener, Edward, Philip Molyneux, and Hoai Nguyen-Linh. 2011. Determinants of efficiency in South East Asian banking. The Service
Industries Journal 31: 2693–719. [CrossRef]
Hoang, Hoang Thi Thanh, Phan Dien Vy, and Jay Bandaralage. 2016. Mergers, Acquisitions and Market Concentration in the Banking
Sector: The Case of Vietnam. Asian Journal of Economics and Empirical Research 3: 49–58. [CrossRef]
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